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The Economic Value of Virtue
* 
 
Virtue is modeled as an asset that women can use in the marriage market: since men value 
virginity in prospective mates, preserving her virtue increases a woman’s chances of 
marrying a high-status husband, and therefore allows for upward social mobility. Consistent 
with some historical and anthropological evidence, we find that the prevalence (and the 
value) of virginity, across societies and over time, can be influenced by socio-economic 
factors such as male income inequality, gender differences, social status and stratification, 
and overall economic development. 
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Since Becker (1973), economic analysis has tried to explain various aspects of human mating,
spouse selection and family formation, the basic question being: "who marries whom and why?"
Therefore, we have now models that can help us to understand a range of issues, from assortative
matching of partners (in terms of human capital, etc.), to inter-sex differences in the age at mar-
riage (Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993), the existence of marriage transaction like dowries (Botticini
and Siow, 2003), and even the so-called mystery of monogamy (Gould et al., 2008). All these
contributions highlight the role played by economic factors in determining, at least partially, the
historical evolution and cross-cultural differentiation of marriage and family patterns.
In this paper we want to show that a simple model of marriage can also explain how the value
of virtue varies across societies, and responds to changing economic conditions inside a given
society. Throughout the paper, we will use a narrow deﬁnition of virtue, as "female virginity at
marriage" (premarital chastity). In a wider sense, however, it might be also deﬁned as "sexual
exclusiveness" (without necessarily implying premarital chastity), or sexual morality. Whatever
the case, virtue can be regarded as an important factor inﬂuencing spouse selection.
The idea of explaining the prevalence of virginity and its social value with economic factors
is, to the best of our knowledge, new. The importance attached to chastity and the way it can
affect human mating has usually been regarded as a cultural, ethical, and religious phenomenon,
neglecting possible interactions with economic variables.1 The only existing economic model of
the evolution of sexual mores (Greenwood and Guner, 2008) explains the increased prevalence
of premarital sex mainly by a dramatic improvement in contraceptive techniques. In that paper,
the economic consequences of premarital sex are not related to the loss of virginity itself, but
rather to the possibility of undesired pregnancy and out-of-wedlock births. However, its almost
exclusive focus on technology implies that it cannot explain, for instance, the variability in the
value and prevalence of virginity before the introduction and diffusion of modern contraception
(symbolized by the birth control pill) in the 20th century, or across traditional societies, many
of which are characterized by highly ineffective contraceptive methods. If, instead, we look at
the contributions of the socio-anthropological and historical literature, we ﬁnd a deep awareness
that economic factors may play an important role in deﬁning the value put by different societies
on (female) virginity.
For instance, in a comparative study of traditional societies, Goethals (1971) observes that vir-
1See Scott (1998) for a cross-national study on the evolution of attitudes towards premarital sex.
2ginity is highly valued when women are looked upon as the property of their husbands: in these
circumstances, virginity attains market value and parents try to preserve their daughters’ virgin-
ity as a means of protecting their own pocketbooks. Broude (1975) shows that class stratiﬁcation
is correlated with premarital sexual norms: if a society is characterized by ﬂuid class structure as
a result of achievable status, parents are expected to prohibit premarital sex to protect the social
standing of their daughter. Goody (1976) sees restrictiveness as a way of avoiding inappropriate
marriages: by controlling a girl’s sexuality, her family can better control her marriage choice, for
the loss of virginity may "diminish a girl’s honour and reduce her marriage chances" (p. 14). In
a more recent paper, Schlegel (1991) claims that the cultural value put on the virginity of girls is,
in large part, a function of the form of marriage transactions. Using data on traditional societies,
she provides some evidence that virginity is relatively more valued when marriage implies trans-
fers of wealth between the families of the bride and the groom ("when no property accompanies
the marriage, virginity is of little interest", p. 725). Moreover, Anderson (2007) reports that the
ancient brideprice was often considered a direct payment for a bride’s virginity.
This view of virtue as an asset that can be used in the marriage market need not apply only
to traditional societies. In a sociological study, Berger and Wenger (1973) defend the idea that
virginity serves the interest of women, helping them to secure a better marriage, if they have little
economic power; it is not a "given", but depends on the economic role of women. In a study of
contemporary China, Zhou (1989) puts forward that virginity is regarded as a marketable asset,
often the only one future wives hold. Ortner (1978) stresses that, in many (modern) societies,
being a "good" girl increases the potential for personal status mobility: in this respect, virginity
plays the same role as a dowry, enhancing the girl’s value for a higher-status spouse. Finally,
Gonzalez-Lopez (2004), after interviewing Mexican fathers living in Los Angeles, reports that,
for them, "protecting their daughters from a sexually dangerous society and improving their
socioeconomic future is of greater concern than preserving virginity per se" (p. 1118).
Most importantly, in a well-known study of the historical evolution of the family in Britain,
Stone (1990, pp. 401-402) claims that, in the 18th century, " ... the value attached to chastity is di-
rectly related to the degree of social hierarchy and the degree of property ownership. Premarital
chastity is a bargaining chip in the marriage game, to be set off against male property and status
right". The female then has "a powerful lever to obtain marriage". As a consequence, Stone ar-
gues: (i) "the most sexually inhibited class in the population is likely to be the lower-middle class
of small property owners"; (ii) "the rise of a class of landless rural labourers and urban workers
without property or status meant the rise of a class to whom virginity was not important, and
3foresight, prudence and planning were irrelevant to their dismal economic future"; (iii) "the de-
velopments of the 18th century, with the progress of enclosures, the amalgamations of farms, the
development of cottage industries and the growth of towns, were causing a considerable increase
in the size of such a class." Stone then suggests that "the principal cause of the rise of illegitimacy
in England in the late 18th century was (...) a rise of the proportion of the propertyless with no
economic stake in the value of their virginity". The change in attitudes towards premarital sex
could thus have been dictated by a change in economic circumstances.
In his study of bastardy in Bavaria, Lee (1977) tries to ﬁnd an explanation for the sexual
revolution that, according to him, took place in Southern Germany between 1750 and 1850. After
dismissing a number of sociological and religious factors (such as the reintroduction of restrictive
marriage legislation, secularization, and educational reform), he concludes that the increasingly
promiscuous social mores ("A virgin! Rara avis") were probably due to higher (real) wages, which
made out-of-wedlock births more affordable. Lee also claims (p. 422) that "a further social factor
affecting the propensity towards high illegitimacy rates was that lower-class illegitimacy did
not constitute such a problem as similar rates among higher social groups would have done",
thus suggesting differences in sexual behavior across social classes. Moreover, he mentions the
possibility that social isolation and class stratiﬁcation increased during the period: this would
imply a negative correlation between the value of chastity and social segregation.
Finally, if we look at contemporary Western societies, we can see that, in the years prior to the
onset of the sexual revolution, which took place in the 1960s and 1970s, and led to the (almost)
complete destigmatizationof premarital sex, the rising incidence ofpremarital sex wascorrelated
to some major socio-economic changes, such as increased female labor force participation, and
an overall reduction in income inequality.2
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model to explain how the value and prevalence of
virginity may depend on economic factors, such as overall economic development, social status,
income distribution, inequality between the sexes, social segregation, and strategic interaction
between the social classes.
Central to our model is the marriage market. Potential partners belong to two different social
classes: the rich and the poor. Income is split between spouses after marriage. Women value
prospective husbands only in terms of income, while men also value virginity in potential wives.
2Evidence on the historical evolution of premarital sex behavior and attitudes towards premarital sex in the U.S. in
the 20th century is provided by Greenwood and Guner (2008, Figures 1 and 2). Data on the labor force participation of
married women can be found in Goldin (1990, Table 5.1). Lindert (2000) reports some evidence on changes in income
inequality.
4Mating is, to some extent, random: a rich man can fall in love with a woman of lower status
(although this is less likely than falling in love with a rich woman). Therefore, a poor woman can
aspire to upward social mobility, if she is lucky enough to be matched (by love) with a well-off
husband. However, virginity also matters; if she is no longer a virgin, love may not be enough
to secure a low-status woman’s marriage to a rich man: he may in fact prefer to marry an upper
class virgin (who he would not have chosen on the basis of love). This deﬁnes the economic value
of virtue as the increase in income after marriage, which can be expected by a girl who makes
the choice to remain a virgin. Investing in chastity affects the outcomes of the marriage market
and strategic behavior arises, since the virginity decisions of rich and poor girls are mutually
dependent. All our results derive from this mechanism: in particular, any factor lowering the
relative returns to a "good" marriage (such as a decrease in male inequality, or a narrower gender
gap) may reduce the value of virginity, thus inducing a larger number of women to engage in
premarital sex. Social segregation also plays an important role: in general, a more ﬂuid class
structure, implying a higherprobability of upward social mobility through marriage, strengthens
– all other things being equal – the incentive for women to preserve their virginity and use it as
an asset in the marriage market.
By suggesting several socio-economic determinants of the economic value of virtue, our
model contributes to explaining both differences across societies and variations over time. How-
ever, this is not to say that other kinds of factors (culture, religious beliefs, technology, etc.) do
not also play an important role in shaping individual behavior and attitudes towards virginity.
The paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section 2 describes the structure
of the basic model. Section 3 solves for the equilibrium, showing how virginity choices depend
on economic variables. Finally, a few concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.
2 The model
In line with some existing literature (Hamilton and Siow, 2007; Nosaka, 2007; Peters and Siow,
2002; Engineer and Welling, 1999), we assume that the marriage market is based on a matching
process.
2.1 Population, preferences and individual characteristics
In the model economy, the population is equally divided between males and females, and be-
tween rich and poor. This means that there are four groups (rich women, rich men, poor women,
5poor men) of equal size, which we normalize to one. The income, or earning capacity, of each
individual is denoted by wg,y, where g = F, M and y = R, P.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that everybody ends up married and polygamy is for-
bidden. Inside every newly formed family, income is equally split between husband and wife, so
that, once married, the income of each spouse is given by (wM + wF)=2.3 If women do not work
on the market, we may think that the individual income of a potential bride (wF,y) derives from
the wealth of her family of origin.4
Like Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) and Gould et al. (2008), we introduce the stark simpliﬁ-
cation that males and females look for different qualities in their prospective mates. The quality
of potential husbands coincides essentially with their income: women prefer to marry rich men.
This can be especially true in traditional societies. On the other hand, men (indexed by i) value
potential wives on the basis of three characteristics – love, virtue and money – which combine to
deﬁne the utility level Ui they obtain from a given match:
Ui = L +iV +Y, (1)
where, > 0 and i 2 (0,).
The variable L stands for "love". It can take only the two values 0 and 1, and is assumed to be
random: a male can fall in love with a female regardless of her income and whether or not she
is a virgin. This reproduces the kind of hypothesis employed by Engineer and Welling (1999):
on the basis of "true love", each person is randomly matched with a member of the opposite sex.
In fact, of course, mating is inﬂuenced by factors such as physical attraction, personal afﬁnity,
chance, etc., which are, to some extent, independent of income and virtue.
V stands for virginity (which can be generalized to "virtue"): it too can take only the values
0 and 1. Men’s innate preference for virginity and/or sexual exclusiveness is well documented.
According to Buss (1994), men characterized by a preference for female virginity enjoyed an evo-
lutionary advantage, since premarital female chastity provided a cue to the future certainty of
3This is the most parsimonious way to introduce a form of resource sharing inside the family. Of course, in many
societies the bargaining power of women is still much lower than that of men, but assuming a different exogenous
bargaining rule would not affect the results of the model. However, it should be noticed that the distribution of
power within a household might rather be endogenous, depending for instance on the relative earning position of the
husband and the wife (as in de la Croix and Vander Donckt, 2010).
4If a dowry system is in place, wF,y can be interpreted as the dowry a girl from social class y is endowed with (i.e.
the straight economic value of the bride). If instead a brideprice custom exists, (wM   wF)=2 might be regarded as
the price paid by the groom to the bride (or to her family). Sometimes, the same culture may simultaneously practice
both brideprice and dowry: for instance, the Code of Hammurabi established that, if a wife died without sons, her
father was entitled to the return of her dowry, minus the value of the bride price (i.e. (3wF   wM)=2 in our model).
6paternity, thus ensuring successful gene transmission.5 Stone (1990) puts it in a more straight-
forward way: men value virginity in potential mates for it guarantees that they are "purchasing
new and not second-hand goods" in the marriage market, and because they value exclusiveness
in the good they buy. Moreover, it makes sense to assume that virtue is not equally important
in deﬁning the desirability of men as potential marriage partners, for the simple reason that it
cannot be assessed in males as easily as in females.
Money (relative income Y = wF=wM) refers to the fact that some of the utility that accrues
to the husband depends on the division of resources inside the family. Equation (1) can be thus
rewritten as:




Y can, in principle, take any positive value, but it would not be unrealistic to assume that 0 <
Y < 1, thus implying that the earning capacity of women is less than that of men.
Notice that we have introduced heterogeneous preferences among male agents: since the
focus of this paper is on virtue, we make the hypothesis that all males have the same preferences
with respect to love and income, while each male attaches a different degree of importance to
virginity. To keep things simple, assume that i is uniformly distributed among rich men, over
the interval (0,). Assume also that > : when choosing a mate for life, love is more important
than virtue or money alone, although it may not be enough if the potential bride lacks both virtue
and money.
It is worth noticing that Buss (1989) has gathered some evidence on sex differences in hu-
man mating preferences. In his study, people in 37 cultures (33 countries) are asked to value the
desirability of some characteristics (income, physical attractiveness, chastity, etc.) of potential
partners, on a 0-3 scale. In 33 of the 37 cultures, men value chastity in potential mates more
than women do, this difference being statistically signiﬁcant in 23 cases; in the 4 countries where
women attach more importance than men to this characteristic, the difference is not signiﬁcant.
The same study shows that, in mate selection, women value good ﬁnancial prospect (earning po-
tential and ambition/industriousness) more than men do in 36 of the 37 samples, while physical
attractiveness (good looks) is more important to men in all 37 cultures. Simple computations on
these data show that, on average, the importance of chastity is 1.08 for men and 0.55 for women.
Physical attractiveness is valued at 2.00 and 1.55 by men and women respectively, while men
5To corroborate his argument, Buss also cites contemporary studies showing that the single best predictor of ex-
tramarital sex is premarital sexual permissiveness. Like the anthropologists, sociologists and historians cited in the
Introduction, he ﬁrmly believes that the cultural variability in the preference for virginity is heavily affected by eco-
nomic factors, particularly the economic independence of women.
7attach much less importance to income than women do (1.51 against 2.28). Overall, these results
providesomejustiﬁcationforoursimplifyingassumptionthatmenandwomenlookfordifferent
characteristics in their prospective mates, and support the idea that is larger than  or .
Ui is the total value of a female, as a potential bride, from the point of view of the i-th male. It
is important to stress that, unlike L and Y, V can be assessed, in general, only after marriage (or
after two potential mates have engaged in a relationship). However, for the sake of simplicity,
let us assume that as soon as a woman enters the marriage market, all the information about her
quality as a prospective bride (L, Y and V) is revealed simultaneously, and this information is
correct. This can be justiﬁed saying that, for instance, women cannot lie – or decide not to lie –
about their virginity, because this might lead to repudiation immediately after marriage (as has
happened, and still happens in some societies). In Appendix A, we will show that our results do
not change if this assumption is removed.
Male and females enter the marriage market as soon as their earning capacity is revealed,
which we assume to take place at the same time for both sexes.6 At that point, all the relevant
variables that determine the value of a potential wife – love, income and virtue – are perfectly
observable.
However, unlike income and love, virtue is not exogenous in our model. Before entering
the marriage market, girls can decide whether to stay a virgin or not. Premarital chastity has
a (utility) cost cy,j, which we assume to be heterogeneous (individual-speciﬁc) and uniformly
distributed over (0,Cy). However, preserving her virginity increases the value of a female on
the marriage market. A woman will therefore decide to remain chaste only if, in her particular
situation, the value of virtue exceeds the cost of virginity.
2.2 Mating
Our model confers an advantage on high-status males, who are free to select their mates: a
marriage proposal made by a rich man will never be rejected since, by assumption, women value
potential husbands exclusively on the basis of their income. This may not be too unrealistic,
especially in less developed countries and traditional societies. For ease of presentation, the
mating process will be described from the point of view of rich males.
As already pointed out, in our model love strikes randomly. This means that there is an ex-
6In traditional societies, where women only engage in housekeeping activities and their resources are provided by
the family, the bride is typically much younger than the groom. See also Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993), whose model
explains why women, in general, marry older men.
8ogenous probability  that a rich man falls in love with a lower-status woman; with a probability
(1   ) he will instead be attracted by a woman from a well-to-do family. It seems sensible to
assume 0 <  < 1=2: since males and females from different social classes have fewer oppor-
tunities to meet each other, different tastes and different levels of education, they are less likely
to feel an afﬁnity and reciprocally fall in love.7 The parameter  can be interpreted as a measure
of the level of stratiﬁcation that characterizes a given society: the lower , the stronger the social
segregation.
Therefore, on the basis of pure love, there would be  marriages involving a rich man and
a poor woman, and 1    marriages in which both spouses come from the upper class. Sym-
metrically,  low-income men should end up married to rich women, while 1    poor-poor
marriages would take place.
However, when deciding who to marry, rich men will also take money and virtue into ac-
count. For instance, if a rich man falls in love with a lower-class woman who is no longer a virgin
(denoted by LVY), he might consider marrying a rich woman he does not love, provided that: (i)
she is virgin (LVY), and (ii) he has a strong preference for virginity, i.e. if i +(wF,R=wM,R) >
 + (wF,P=wM,R). If instead he loves an upper-class woman who turns out to be a non-virgin
(LVY), he would nevertheless marry her because he cannot ﬁnd a better match: given men’s
preferences, namely > i, she will be preferred to a LVY-type wife.
Therefore, all well-off women who are lucky enough to win the love of a rich man will end
up married to him, while only low-status women who are also virgins (LVY) can secure a good
marriage. Poor women who are not matched (by love) with a higher-status man have no chance
of upward social mobility, while rich women in the same situation still have a chance of getting
a rich husband, provided they have preserved their virginity.
The role of virtue as an instrument for (upward) social mobility is then clear: in the marriage
market, virginity is an asset whose value can be deﬁned in expected terms and depends, for
instance, on male preferences and the behavior of other women in the market. Let us see how.
2.3 The value of virtue
For the time being, let us consider the proportion of virgins among poor and rich women (vP and
vR, respectively) as given. Let us also deﬁne wM,R  w and assume that wF,P = w, wF,R = w
and wM,P = w, with 0  ,,  1,  <  and  < . These restrictions on the parameters
7For example, even if rich and poor women have the same chance of being graced with beauty, rich women have
more occasions to meet a rich man who can be impressed by their beauty.
9mean simply that wF,y < wM,y, 8y (as far as premarital income is concerned, men are always
richer than women from the same social class), and wg,P < wg,R, 8g (high-status agents are richer
than low-status individuals of the same sex). However, we do not impose any restriction on the
relation between wF,R and wM,P, so that well-off women may have a higher premarital income
than poor men.
2.3.1 The poor
Consider now the point of view of the  low-status females, who happen to be matched, on the
basis of love, with rich males. Among these women, the less virtuous ones (i.e. (1   vP) LVY-
type females) can potentially be ranked lower, as marriage partners, than LVY-type females. How
many of them will actually suffer this fate depends on male preferences. In fact, as we have seen
above, a rich man can decide to marry a woman whom he does not love, but is both wealthy and
virgin (LVY), instead of the one he loves, who lacks both status and virtue (LVY), if and only if
i >  +(  ).
In particular, there will be a "threshold" male individual, characterized by i = ˆ  =   
(   ), who is indifferent between LVY and LVY. Men with i < ˆ  would prefer to marry
the lower-class woman they love, regardless of her virtue, while those characterized by i > ˆ 
would prefer a LVY-type wife.8
Since i is uniformly distributed over the interval (0,), this means that the number of LVY-





The number of them who will be actually "replaced" by rich, yet unloved, virgins depends
on the availability of this kind of marriage partner. For instance, if vR  (1   vP)(  )=, all
of them will be replaced. Taking this into account, the probability of a poor, non-virgin woman
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, (4)
while the probability that she ends up married to a low-status husband is:
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. (5)
8If i < ˆ , love is stronger than everything, being able to compensate for the lack of both money and virtue.
10Losing her virginity exposes a poor woman, who has been matched by love to a high-status
man, to a double risk. First, that man might be willing to search for a better marriage partner if
he cares enough about virginity. Second, her place may be actually taken by a LVY-type female,
if there are enough potential mates of this kind in the marriage market.
Let us now look at the expected income of a poor woman.

















This expression means that, with probability , a low-status female who manages to preserve
her virtue is able to increase her income (as a wife) by (1  )w=2, with respect to a "benchmark"
marriage to a poor husband.
In case she is not a virgin, her expected income is affected by the possibility of missing a rich
husband because of her premarital sexual behavior, and can be written as:
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which, after substituting, becomes:
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Therefore, the "value of virginity" (for a poor woman) can be deﬁned as the difference be-
tween (7) and (9), which is the expected income gain associated with preserving her virginity:

P  











Notice that the economic value of virtue for the poor increases with  (it is higher if there
is less social segregation and thus a higher – ceteris paribus – chance of social mobility) and w
(the absolute level of income). It is also decreasing in : the higher the relative income of poor
men, the smaller the cost associated with missing a high-status husband. Moreover, if vR 
(1   vP)(  )=, the economic value of virginity depends positively on  and (  ): both
these factors (deﬁning men’s preferences for income and the income differential between rich
11and poor women), reduce the likelihood of non-virgin poor women being selected as marriage
partners by rich men, thus increasing the cost of losing their virginity; 
P is also a non-increasing
function of: if men attach great importance to love, virginity is less likely to play a decisive role
in mate selection. Finally, if vR < (1   vP)(  )=, 
P depends positively on the prevalence
of virginity among poor and rich females (vP and vR, respectively): a relatively large number of
virgins, in both social classes, increases the likelihood that poor, non-virgin women actually miss
the opportunity of a good marriage, thus increasing the returns to virginity. From the point of
view of low-status girls, preserving their virtue can be seen as a kind of "defensive" investment,
which is a strategic complement to the virginity choice of other girls in the marriage market.
2.3.2 The rich
We can now follow the same procedure to determine 
R, the value of virginity for rich women.
If she stays chaste, a rich woman can secure a good marriage with probability (1   ) (the
probability that a rich man falls in love with her); moreover, she also gets a chance to marry a
rich man who does not love her, taking the place of a LVY-type female. Therefore, the expected




























this expression, once we use wM,R  w, wF,P = w, wF,R = w and wM,P = w, becomes:
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If, however, a rich woman has lost her virginity, there is no way she can be ranked higher












which can be easily simpliﬁed to:




This expression means that, with probability , a high-status female who is no longer a virgin
would see her income decrease by (1   )w=2, with respect to a marriage to a male from the
same social class.
12The difference between (12) and (14) deﬁnes the value of virginity for women from well-to-do
families:

R  (1   )min

1,






It should be noticed that, if vR > (1   vP)(   )=, 
R is a negative function of both vP
and vR: with relatively higher aggregate "virginity rates", there will be less opportunities for rich,
yet unloved women to end up married to well-off husbands. As a consequence, their expected
rewards for preserving their virtue would be less. Not surprisingly, the value of virginity for the
rich also depends on the opportunity cost of a good marriage: for instance a higher , meaning
a smaller income difference between a low- and a high-status husband, implies lower relative
returns to chastity.
3 Equilibrium
We have just seen that the economic value of virtue, from the female point of view, depends on
the behavior of other women competing in the marriage market. Therefore, premarital (virginity)
choices are strategic in nature.
3.1 Virginity choices
Let us now recall that there is also a cost associated to virtue (the utility loss implied by giving
up premarital sex). This cost is individual speciﬁc; for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed to be
uniformlydistributedovertheintervals[0,Cy], where y = R, P. Thesedistributionsareknownto
female agents. A woman will decide to preserve her virginity if the value of virtue (
y) exceeds
its cost (cy,j). In other words, we can identify threshold costs c
y = 
y such that only women with
cy,j < c
y decide to opt for chastity. Accordingly, we can determine the endogenous proportion of
virgins in each income class, as vy = 
y=Cy.
3.2 Aggregate behavior
Let us assume that CR = CP and CP  A, with , A  0.9
Since 
P and 
R both depend on vP and vR, the virginity choices of rich and poor women are
mutually dependent: every woman decides on her premarital behavior taking into account how
9We do not restrict  to be larger or smaller than 1, since we do not have elements to think that the utility cost
of abstinence is related to income or social status. Of course, the social stigma attached to premarital sex may vary
across classes, and is probably itself related to potential outcomes of the marriage market.
13many virgins she thinks there are among women from the two social classes. We can therefore
write the following aggregate best-response functions:
vP =




























[A   2w(1   )vR]=A) if vR < (  )(1   vP)=
w(1   )(  )=(2A) if vR  (  )(1   vP)=
, (18)





w(1   )=(2A) if vR  (  )(1   vP)=
p
w(1   )(  )(1   vP)=(2A) if vR > (  )(1   vP)=
. (19)
3.3 Equilibrium solutions
In this framework, an equilibrium can be deﬁned as a pair (v
R;v
P), such that (i) the underlying
threshold values (c
R and c
P) ensure that subjective optimality is realized, and (ii) women’s beliefs
are mutually consistent. Graphically, any intersection between (18) and (19) in the (vR,vP) space
is an equilibrium.
Depending on the parameters, we may have two different cases. Let us deﬁne
ˆ  
2A(  )
w(1   )[2 +2(  )2]
, (20)
and focus only on interior solutions.




















and corner solutions are automatically ruled out since ˆ  < 2A=[w(1   )].








w(1   )(  )[2A   w(1   )(  )]
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14ThesituationisdepictedinFigure1, wherethetwocurves RR and PP representtheaggregate
best-response functions of the rich and the poor, respectively, and the downward sloping dashed
line is vP = 1  vR=[(   )]. For  < ˆ  ( > ˆ ), RR and PP intersect below (above)
vP = 1  vR=[(   )]. It is important to underline that, as it will be shown in Appendix B
(together with the derivation of ˆ ), the possibility of multiple equilibria can easily be ruled out,
while (va
R ;va
P ) and (vb
R ;vb




















R if  < a, where a  2A=[w(1 )(1+)]. This condition is always
veriﬁed if, for instance, we make the parsimonious assumption that  < =[(  )], since in
this case ˆ  < a. Therefore, if  is relatively low, and the utility cost of chastity is not too much
higher for rich women, virtue is positively correlated with social status, as historical evidence
seems to suggest (Stone, 1990). Moreover, vb
P < vb
R if  < b, where b  2A=[w(1   )(  
)(1 +)]. Since we cannot exclude that  > b (if b < 1=2, of course), it is possible that, with
low levels of social segregation, virginity is more widespread in the lower social class.
Let us now see how the equilibrium values of vP and vR are affected by the main parameters
of the model.
In case (a), it can easily be checked that, for y = P, R: ¶va
y =¶ > 0, ¶va
y =¶w > 0, ¶va
y =¶ < 0,
¶va
y =¶ < 0 and ¶va
y =¶A < 0.
In case (b), provided that  < ˜ , where ˜  = A=[w(1   )(  )], we have: ¶vb
y =¶ > 0,
15¶vb
y =¶w > 0, ¶vb
y =¶ > 0, ¶vb
y =¶ < 0, ¶vb
y =¶ > 0, ¶vb
y =¶ < 0, ¶vb
y =¶ < 0 and ¶vb
y =¶A <
0. Moreover ¶vb
R =¶ < 0.
Therefore, the prevalence of virginity is in general positively linked to , meaning that with
a less ﬂuid class structure, which implies a smaller chance of upward social mobility through
marriage, there is less incentive for women to preserve their virginity and use it as an asset in
the marriage market. In addition, virginity rates decrease with  and : both a narrower gender
gap and less male inequality imply a lower value of virginity (because of the lower relative value
of a high-status husband), thus reducing the incentive to stay a virgin; in absence of inequal-
ity, the preference of men for virgin brides would not affect female behavior. Finally, all other
things being equal, overall economic development (w) induces more chastity, since it increases
the absolute value of a good marriage.10 All these results are consistent with the historical and
cross-cultural evidence discussed in the Introduction.
In our model, male preferences ( and ) also affect women’s choices, but only if  is suf-
ﬁciently large ( > ˆ ), i.e. if social segregation is rather weak. In particular, if men have very
strong preferences for "love" (or beauty) when selecting potential brides, and/or do not attach
great importance to "money", poor women who lost their virtue face a relatively low risk of miss-
ing a good marriage. This in turn leads to low virginity rates. The effect of female preferences (A
and ) is trivial: a higher utility cost of virtue implies lower virginity rates, among both rich and
poor women.11
It should be noticed, however, that if ˜  < 1=2, the effect of some parameters on the behav-
ior of high-status women would be different. In fact, for  > ˜  we would have, for instance:
¶vb
R =¶ < 0, ¶vb
R =¶w < 0, ¶vb
R =¶ > 0 and ¶vb
R =¶ > 0. This means that there might be a
non-monotonic relationship between vb
R and : as long as 0 <  < ˜ , the prevalence of vir-
ginity among high-status females depends positively on , but for high values of  ( > ˜ ,
i.e. very weak social segregation), further increases in  cause a reduction in the number of rich
women who opt for premarital chastity (and vb
R eventually becomes lower than vb
P , as soon as
 > b).12 Unlike case (a), in case (b) an upward shift of both PP and RR in Figure 1 (induced by
a higher ) can determine a new equilibrium characterized by a higher v
P and a lower v
R. This
10Economic development is not independent, however, of female labor force participation, inequality, etc.
11In this regard, notice that the cost of virginity might be affected, for instance, by the effectiveness of contraception.
If the perceived risk of an undesired pregnancy decreases, the relative cost of chastity becomes larger. Therefore, as
suggested by Greenwood and Guner (2008), technological improvements in contraception, increasing A, encourage
promiscuity.
12Provided that b > ˜ . If, instead, ˜  > b (which occurs for  > 1), vb
R becomes lower than vb
P before it starts
decreasing.
16might happen because, with a very ﬂuid class structure (i.e. for high values of ), the incentive to
preserve their virginity is very strong for low-status women; consequently, vP is very large, rich
virgins have few chances of replacing a LVY-type woman, and vR (as a function of vP) decreases
steeply.
Finally, it can be conjectured that the prevalence of virginity also depends on the distribution
of power within a household. In our model, an (exogenous) increase of the relative bargain-
ing power of the wife would increase, ceteris paribus, the value of virtue, thus leading to higher
virginity rates.13 However, the empowerment of women may also be associated with more sex-
ual freedom, if the bargaining power is endogenous and depends, for instance, on the relative
earning position of men and women.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how, inside a society, the prevalence of female virginity can be af-
fected by economic variables. Using a very parsimonious mating model, where preserving her
virtue helps a woman to improve her chances of marrying a husband of higher social status, we
have obtained results that are fairly consistent with cross-cultural and historical evidence. In par-
ticular, economic development, increased female labor force participation, lower male inequality,
stronger social stratiﬁcation and higher social status may all weaken the incentive for women to
preserve their virtue, thus explaining a lower prevalence of virginity. This is a further example
of how the incentives to adhere to cultural and moral values can be shaped by economic factors.
Appendices
A Alternative timing
In Section 2 we made the simplifying assumption that virginity (V or V), like every other char-
acteristic of prospective brides, can be observed before marriage or, which comes to the same
thing, as soon as a woman enters the marriage market. In this Appendix we want to show that
13Suppose that, instead of 1=2, the woman receives a fraction 1=n of the after-marriage income of the couple: a
smaller n would account for a higher bargaining power of the wife. Doepke and Tertilt (2009) provide some examples
of signiﬁcant improvements of married women’s economic rights which took place in 19th century America, when
the legal treatment of men and married women in the labor market was still highly unequal and female labor force
participation still very low, as also reported by Goldin (1990, Figure 5.1). Interestingly enough, in that period the
American society was also characterized by a trend toward sexual repressiveness.
17an alternative, more complicated but more realistic timing of events is also compatible with our
model. Everything is based on the hypothesis that, unlike income Y and other factors suscep-
tible of affecting L (beauty, for instance), virtue is not immediately observable, and can only be
assessed after two potential spouses have started a relationship.
Since  >  and V is unobservable, as soon as the marriage market opens, rich men will
start dating their potential best choices, i.e. the women they are in love with, regardless of their
income. Among these "lucky" females, consider ﬁrst the poor ones. If they turn out to be virgin
(LVY type), they will be able to secure a marriage with their higher-status mate, because he can-
not ﬁnd a better match (recall that  > , by assumption). If, however, they are not virgins and
their potential husbands attach great importance to virginity (i > ˆ  =   (  )), the men
will start looking for a better match among rich women (a LVY-type female). Therefore, some
(or all) LVY-type females will be replaced with LVY-type females, depending on the relative size
of these two groups. A rich woman who is loved by a rich man, even if she is not a virgin (LVY),
is not exposed to the same risk, because her prospective husband could not ﬁnd a better mate
(given men’s preferences, namely  > , she will still be preferred to a LVY female). Once all
the rich men have found their best possible wives, the remaining women will marry poor men.
It is thus clear that exactly the same results arise as we obtained in Section 2: premarital
chastity is still an instrument for upward social mobility.
B Ruling out multiple equilibria
Let us start by showing how ˆ  is determined. In the model developed in Section 2 and 3, an equi-
librium (v
R;v
R) can be found as an intersection between the linear part of (18) and the non-linear
part of (19), if vR > (   )(1   vP)=, or between the linear part of (19) and the non-linear
part of (18), if vR < (   )(1   vP)=. If, instead, vR = (   )(1   vP)=, the equilib-
rium pair (v
R;v
R) corresponds to the intersection between vP = w(1   )(  )=(2A) and
vR = w(1   )=(2A). However, it can be easily checked that this intersection lies on the line
vP = 1  vR=[(  )] if and only if:
 =
2A(  )
w(1   )[2 +2(  )2]
,
which is ˆ .
In principle, our model might produce multiple equilibria. However, for indeterminacy
to occur, the two intersections between vP = (1=2)(1 
p
[A   2w(1   )vR]=A) and vR =
18w(1   )=(2A) should both lie below the horizontal line vP = w(1   )(  )=(2A) or,
equivalently, below vP = 1  vR=[(  )] (which is the dashed line in Figure 1), since we are
in case (a), characterized by  < ˆ . Given that one of the two possible crossing points is char-
acterized by v
P = 1=2[1 +
p
1   2w2(1   )2=(A2)], which is always larger than w(1  
)(  )=(2A) if  < ˆ , we can conclude that multiplicity of equilibria never arises.
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